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Abstract 
This paper looks at Energy Savings Obligations in 
the UK. More specifically, it discusses how the 
policy instrument changed over time and what the 
drivers of that change were. The UK was the first 
country in Europe that introduced Energy Savings 
Obligations on suppliers to save energy at the 
customer end in 1994. Since then this policy 
changed rapidly and is now the principal 
instrument to deliver energy savings in the housing 
stock. This paper aims to answer three questions: 
First, how did the policy instrument change over 
time? Second, what were the key drivers of that 
change? Third, how did those pressures filter 
through the policy process and affect the energy 
savings obligations? 
Keywords 
energy savings obligations; energy efficiency 
policy; policy change 
 
1 Introduction 
One of the most frequently cited drivers for policy 
change is the emergence of crises such as energy 
price shocks (Campbell 2004). The oil crisis in 
1973 is a good example for policy change induced 
by crises in the form of non-linear price signals: 
Whereas before energy efficiency was of very 
limited political concern, this changed ‘almost 
overnight’ (Eyre 1997, p. 2). However, while 
unexpected sudden crisis type events certainly can 
explain some of the shifts in energy efficiency 
policy, many of the changes were the result of more 
gradual and long-term pressures such as the 
expected impact of climate change, rising energy 
prices, institutional changes, and increasing fuel 
poverty. 
Considering the above, this paper looks at the 
process of policy change in the context of home 
energy efficiency focusing on Energy Savings 
Obligations in the UK, the so-called Supplier 
Obligation (SO). The SO started back in 1994, 
around the time when energy markets were 
liberalised in the UK. Since then, it has become a 
high profile policy and is now the principal 
instrument to reduce carbon emissions in the UK 
housing stock and the second most important 
climate policy after the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme. However, in the beginning the targets 
imposed by the SO were at a much lower level 
compared to the scale they reached in more recent 
years. Nobody would have anticipated the 
remarkable change the SO has gone through over 
the last 18 years. This paper asks a simple question: 
How could a fairly modest policy instrument 
develop to become the most important element by 
far in the UK policy mix tackling carbon emissions 
in the domestic sector? 
The research is based on fifteen expert interviews 
in the UK covering all of the key stakeholders 
involved such as energy suppliers, government 
departments and agencies, researchers, and industry 
associations. Furthermore, a broad document 
analysis has been carried out covering the years 
1994-2010. In many cases claims by the 
interviewees could be backed up with official 
documents. However, where no specific evidence is 
given to support a claim, the reader may assume it 
was based on the expert interviews the author 
conducted. Because some interviewees had 
potential conflicts of interests and their responses 
may have been biased as a result, further interviews 
and documents were used as a means of 
triangulation. 
Following this question, the paper is structured to 
include four distinct parts: First, the paper 
introduces the basic architecture of the UK 
Supplier Obligation (SO). Second, an overview of 
its change over time is presented. Third, the 
patterns and drivers of policy change are analysed 
in detail focusing on eight key areas. Finally, a 
concluding section sums up which drivers may help 
explaining the policy change experienced in the 
UK, provides an outlook to the future of the SO, 
and suggests further promising research avenues. 
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2 Background on the UK Supplier Obligation 
This section presents the architecture of the SO in 
order to give the reader a good overview of how the 
scheme works; so far a comprehensive summary of 
the SO’s design is lacking in the academic 
literature. The following will be descriptive but is 
deemed important for a thorough understanding of 
the policy instrument under investigation. 
In the UK the SO is the most important instrument 
to deliver energy and carbon savings in the 
domestic sector (OFGEM 2005) and both the 2004 
and 2007 Energy Efficiency Action Plans highlight 
the SO as the principal policy mechanism to deliver 
energy savings in the domestic sector (2004b, 
2007b). The basic concept of the SO is that central 
government imposes an energy savings target on 
large energy suppliers (gas and electricity) that has 
to be achieved at the customer end, which may 
relate to energy consumption or carbon emissions. 
Businesses and industrial end-users are not covered 
by the scheme, they are targeted by other policy 
instruments such as the Climate Change Levy and 
Climate Change Agreements, as well as the 
recently introduced Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. 
In the UK, the target is set by the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) for a defined 
period of time using a bottom-up approach 
assuming an illustrative mix of various energy 
saving measures that is likely to be used in order to 
deliver the obligation. Note that it is established in 
comparison to a baseline and does not require a 
reduction of final energy use. Rather, it is defined 
in terms of lifetime savings achieved by the 
measures promoted via the obligation. The energy 
regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(OFGEM), is responsible for administering the SO 
and enforcing it. OFGEM defines individual 
savings targets for each energy supplier and checks 
whether the obligated companies achieve them. 
There are various routes the energy suppliers use 
(Figure 1): First, the energy suppliers contract 
installers of energy saving measures (for example 
cavity wall insulation) that carry out the work in 
homes according to a defined standard and with a 
certain benchmark for energy and / or carbon 
savings. Second, they may subsidise energy 
efficient products (for example insulation material) 
sold via ‘do it yourself’ (DIY) and other retailers. 
Third, energy suppliers deliver their obligation 
through work with managing agents, Local 
Authorities, supermarkets and other retailers which 
in turn subcontract installers and manage the 
delivery process.  
Finally, energy companies may choose to work 
with the home occupants directly. In the past, 
energy companies have for example promoted the 
use of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) via mass 
mail-outs of free light bulbs, although this is now 
prohibited. More recently, some energy companies, 
such as British Gas, set up their own insulation 
business and deliver most of their obligation 
themselves. 
The SO is based on self-reporting and a certain 
degree of trust: While OFGEM dip-checks the 
figures provided by the energy suppliers, they do 
not check measure by measure given the 
administrative burden this would involve. In 
theory, energy suppliers could inflate their 
figures, but the potential fine for doing this and 
for not achieving the target is significant: up to 
10% of global turnover of the obligated 
companies in case they miss their target. 
Figure 1 sketches the basic architecture of the SO 
as described above. Note that for illustrative 
reasons the figure cannot cover all the details 
sufficiently and different energy suppliers use a 
mix of different delivery routes. 
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Figure 1: Architecture of the SO 
 
While there was a succession of different SOs, 
the basic logic remained the same. The first SO 
was called Energy Efficiency Standards of 
Performance (EESoP) and ran from 1994 to 1998. 
Its successors, EESoP 2 and EESoP 3, ran from 
1998 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2002 respectively. 
In 2002, the scheme’s name was changed to 
Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC). EEC 1 
was in place from 2002 to 2005 and EEC 2 from 
2005 to 2008. EEC was eventually renamed in 
2008 to the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
(CERT) that runs from 2008 to 2012. For the 
post-CERT period a new scheme, called Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO), is planned. In some 
instances the name change reflected changes of 
the SO, such as a change of focus from energy to 
carbon emissions when CERT was introduced 
(see more details below), but generally the 
changing of names should not be overrated 
because the main principles did not change 
significantly and all schemes are a succession of 
the SO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Main changes to the Savings Obligation over 
time 
The main change identified is the overall 
ambition of the SO which is determined by the 
target size. A good indicator of policy change is 
also the cost associated with the SO. Other 
changes included changes in the design with 
regard to social equity, trading, banking, the mix 
of measures, quotas for specific measures, 
administration of the SO, and customer coverage. 
3.1 Target 
Regarding the energy savings target, there were 
two substantial changes: First, it was raised 
significantly since 1994, and second, its 
definition changed. 
The total energy savings target of the SO in 1994-
1998 and 2008-2012 cannot be directly 
compared, because the EESoP 1 target was 
defined in terms of energy to be saved over the 
lifetime of the measures, whereas CERT defines 
the target in Mt CO2 (lifetime). According to 
OFGEM (2008c), the CERT target is equivalent 
to doubling the target under EEC 2, which was 
130 TWh (lifetime). Taking into account the 20% 
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uplift in September 2008 (see section 4.3) and the 
extension of the scheme to December 2012, the 
total (implicit) energy savings target of CERT is 
almost 500 TWh  (lifetime). This means that the 
original SO target of 6 TWh (lifetime) increased 
eightyfold from 1994-1998 to 2008-2012. Again, 
these figures are not comparable on a like-for-like 
basis because the length of the various SOs 
differs. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper an 
average (implicit) annual energy savings target is 
calculated that allows direct comparison of the 
schemes (see figure below). 
 
Figure 2: Changes to the policy target 
 
Source: based on various reports (DEFRA 2008; 
OFFER 1998; OFGEM 2005, 2008b, 2009a, 
2009b; OFGEM and Energy Saving Trust 2003) 
 
The figure shows that the implicit annual energy 
savings target increased almost seventyfold from 
1994-1998 to 2008-2012, which represents a 
considerable change. However, there are further 
caveats to comparing the targets on a like-for-like 
basis: The target definition changed over time. 
Under EESoP 1 and 2, the target only related to 
electricity, EESoP 3 set a target for both 
electricity and gas separately and the EEC 1 and 
2 targets were fuel standardised, allowing 
suppliers to achieve savings in homes heated by 
gas, electricity, coal, oil or LPG. Energy savings 
were carbon weighted and discounted in line with 
the HM Treasury Green Book, although the rate 
changed over time (guidelines for carrying out 
cost-benefit analysis). Hence EEC 1 and 2 
essentially already set carbon targets. CERT then 
changed the target from energy to carbon 
emissions and abolished the discounting 
procedure (OFGEM 2009a). All this makes it 
difficult to compare the targets on a like-for-like 
basis and further data correction is required for a 
more precise comparison. However, the overall 
magnitude of target change is still notable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Cost of programme 
As a result of increasing targets, the cost of the 
programme went up from just £101.7 million in 
EESoP 1 (£25 million per year) (OFGEM and 
Energy Saving Trust 2003) to £5.5 billion in 
CERT (£1.2 billion per year) (DEFRA 2008). 
While EESoP 1 and 2 obliged energy suppliers to 
spend a certain amount of money, later versions 
of the SO only provided indicative figures that 
were nonbinding. Suppliers passed on the costs of 
the SO to their customers via energy bills, and 
customers made contributions to some of the 
measures as well. Expenditures were subject to 
supply price control (and the 1998 supply price 
restraint) in earlier versions of the SO (EESoP 1 
and 2), prescribing the maximum that could be 
charged. However, expenditure in later versions 
did not fall under such tight control and only 
indicative figures were provided. The average bill 
did increase by only £1 per household per year 
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during the EESoP 1 scheme (£1.5 in 2008 prices), 
but by more than £50 per household per year 
under CERT (in 2008 prices), leading to a more 
than thirtyfold increase over 18 years (corrected 
for inflation). The costs of saving one unit of 
electricity or gas during EEC 1 was 1.3p/kWh 
and 0.5p/kWh respectively (Lees 2006). Slightly 
higher costs were involved in the delivery of EEC 
2 (electricity: 2.1p/kWh, gas: 0.6p/kWh) but still 
considerably below household energy prices 
(Lees 2008). 
Note that these are average cost figures and some 
customers contributed more than others. Also, 
some customers did not benefit from the SO 
whereas others did. According to a national 
survey conducted in 2011, 39% of all households 
in the UK benefited from measures supported by 
CERT since 2008 (Ipsos MORI et al. 2011). 
3.3 Other notable changes 
While the overall ambition and cost of the SO is 
probably the most remarkable change, there were 
other modifications that are notable: 
Social equity: The first three SO schemes 
did not set a specific target for 
disadvantaged customers. However, 
EEC 1 was the first scheme that put in 
place a target for the so-called Priority 
Group, the defined group of 
disadvantaged customer. 50% of all 
savings had to be achieved within the 
Priority Group (OFGEM 2001). This 
target did not change in EEC 2 (OFGEM 
2004), but with CERT the target was 
reduced to 40% (OFGEM 2009b) (see 
section 4.6). 
Trading: EESoP 1-3 did not allow trading 
of energy savings between suppliers and 
trading of energy saving obligations was 
only allowed with the start of EEC 1. 
Suppliers were allowed to buy 
certificates from or sell those to other 
suppliers. However, trading did not play 
a major role, and only very few suppliers 
traded parts of their individual targets 
(Powells 2009). 
Banking: Since EEC 1, suppliers are 
allowed to carry over energy savings 
from one SO period to another. In the 
beginning this was limited to 10% of the 
target, but this limit was abolished with 
the inception of EEC 2. 
Eligible measures: Later versions of the 
SO also allowed the energy suppliers to 
use non-energy efficiency measures such 
as micro-renewables, but so far this was, 
and still is, at a very low level. Also, 
both ground and air source heat pumps 
were used as part of the heating 
measures, but only contributed a small 
proportion to the total savings achieved. 
Minimum quotas: As part of the CERT 
extension and for the first time since the 
inception of the SO, DECC decided to 
set a minimum share for insulation 
measures. Subsequently, suppliers were 
required to achieve 68% of the target 
under CERT by investing in insulation 
measures (see section 4.8). 
Administration: The target for EESoP 1-3 
was set by the regulator whereas after 
2002 the government acquired the target 
setting powers (see detailed discussion 
below in section 4.4). 
Coverage: Early versions of the SO 
(EESoP 1-3) allowed energy suppliers to 
target both domestic customers as well 
as small businesses. This changed with 
EEC 1 and only domestic customers 
could be targeted. 
The list above only highlights some of the notable 
modifications and is by no means comprehensive. 
 
3.4 Summary of changes to the Supplier 
Obligation over time  
Table 1 summarises how the scheme changed 
since its inception in 1994: 
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Table 1: History of the SO in the UK 
 
Source: based on various sources (DECC 2010a, 
2010b; DEFRA 2008; OFFER 1994, 1998; 
OFGEM 2005, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b; OFGEM 
and Energy Saving Trust 2003) 
 
The paper will now proceed with analysing the 
identified policy drivers that led to the changes  
summarised above. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Key drivers of change 
This section sets out in more detail six of the key 
pressures that contributed to the remarkable 
change of the SO, namely market liberalisation 
and ideas around Least Cost Planning, climate 
change, rising energy prices, change of key 
personnel, institutional change, and fuel poverty. 
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4.1 Market liberalisation and Least Cost 
Planning 
The beginnings of the SO can be found in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. In the early 1980s, the 
new ‘neoliberal energy paradigm’ (Fudge et al. 
2011) or the ‘new utility regulatory regime’ 
(Helm 2002) began to take shape and the newly 
elected Conservative government saw its task ‘to 
set a framework which will ensure that the market 
operates in the energy sector with a minimum of 
distortion and energy is produced and consumed 
efficiently’ (Lawson 1982). So energy efficiency 
was not debated in the context of reducing carbon 
emissions as it is today, but it was very much 
perceived as a means to achieve economic 
efficiency and maximise economic productivity 
of the economy at the time. The arrival of the 
new government was followed by initiatives to 
liberalise the markets for energy and open them 
up for competition, as this was seen as the most 
suitable way of achieving efficient supply and 
consumption of energy (Helm 2003). 
The energy market liberalisation in the 1980s 
resulted in the creation of two independent 
regulators: the Office of Electricity Regulation 
(OFFER) and the Office of Gas Supply 
(OFGAS). Their primary duty consisted of 
having to develop competitive markets and 
regulate prices in those areas where competition 
was not feasible (e.g. natural monopolies) (Owen 
2006). The 1986 Gas Act also put a ‘duty to 
promote the efficient use of gas’ on OFGAS. The 
1989 Electricity Act made provisions for OFFER 
to ‘determine ... standards of performance in 
connection with the promotion of the efficient use 
of electricity by consumers as ... ought to be 
achieved by ... suppliers’. Hence, the promotion 
of energy efficiency was part of the primary 
legislation and regulators had the task to ensure 
energy was supplied and consumed efficiently. It 
was assumed that once energy markets were fully 
liberalised, energy efficiency services would be 
offered by the energy companies as part of their 
portfolio to compete against each other. However, 
until full competition was actually reached, 
policy makers accepted that some sort of 
intervention by the regulator to encourage greater 
efficiency on the demand side would be 
necessary (see for example OFGAS 1994). 
Therefore, most of the discussions at the time 
were dominated by the discourse of competition 
and economic efficiency. 
As a result of those debates in the 1980s, there 
was considerable interest in instruments to 
incentivise energy efficiency and in particular in 
the so called Least-Cost-Planning approach 
(LCP), which was used in the US for encouraging 
utilities to take into account the demand side and 
potential energy savings option at the customer 
end. LCP is based on the assumption that people 
do not want to buy energy, but energy services, 
and those should be provided at lowest cost. 
Where it is cheaper to save a unit of energy rather 
than supplying it, utilities should opt for the 
demand reduction option and vice versa (Sant 
1979). It is easy to see why this particular policy 
instrument generated a lot of interest in the UK as 
it fitted very well with the dominant way of 
thinking at the time. 
This idea of using utilities as the agents to roll out 
energy efficiency programmes was discussed in 
the UK context. For example, in the mid-1980s, 
in a series of reports called ‘Lessons from 
America’, the Association for the Conservation of 
Energy (ACE) presented the US way of 
approaching energy efficiency in utility 
regulation. The idea of using a LCP-type 
instrument in the UK was investigated further, for 
example in a report by ACE commissioned by 
OFGAS, that generally deemed such an approach 
suitable and beneficial (Brown 1990). It also 
featured in an OFFER consultation on energy 
efficiency (OFFER 1991), although it was argued 
in the document that LCP might not fit with the 
UK context that well, mainly because there was 
competition in supply. 
However, the LCP approach using utilities was 
endorsed by the House of Commons Environment 
Committee in a report on energy efficiency which 
viewed ‘energy utilities and their regulators as 
key players in funding and implementing energy 
efficiency programmes’ and called for ‘a 
fundamental shift in attitudes and approach on the 
part of the utilities and other power generators’ 
(House of Commons Environment Committee 
1993a, para 5). The Committee also travelled to 
the US to study LCP policies in various US 
states. NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace supported the LCP approach and the 
idea of using utilities as vehicles for the delivery 
of energy efficiency programmes. While British 
Gas clearly resisted any move into the direction 
of LCP, the electricity utilities reacted more 
measured. Some utilities such as East Midland 
Electricity and Manweb even supported LCP and 
carried out pilot projects in that area. Other 
electricity utilities, such as South Western 
Electricity and Eastern Electricity, were more 
concerned and reluctant to embrace the concept 
of LCP (House of Commons Environment 
Committee 1993a). 
The discussions bore fruit and according to the 
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second year report on the Environment White 
Paper the government saw utilities in a good 
position to carry out energy efficiency measures 
at the customer end (HM Government 1992). 
 
4.2 Climate change 
In the last two decades climate change policy 
became much more high profile in the UK and 
emerged as a distinct policy area after Margaret 
Thatcher had mentioned climate change as a 
substantial challenge to mankind in her 1988 
landmark speech to the Royal Society (Pearce 
2006). Her speech manifested a sharp turning 
point in her government’s approach towards 
environmental policy and drew the public’s 
attention to the issue of climate change 
(Anderson 1991). However, while climate change 
policy started to emerge as a new policy area in 
the 1990s, it was not a major driver of the SO in 
the early 1990s, although the first British SO, 
EESoP1, was partly introduced as a result of 
national climate policy: together with the E-factor 
(an energy efficiency price premium for gas), 
EESoP 1 was supposed to raise money for the 
Energy Saving Trust (EST) that was established 
by the government, British Gas, and public 
electricity supply companies in 1992 to reduce 
home energy use and the associated carbon 
emissions. The EST played a key role in the 
government’s climate policy strategy for the 
domestic sector as outlined in the 1994 UK 
Climate Change Program (HM Government 
1994). 
The importance of climate change as a policy 
driver began to increase at the end of the late 
1990s: Following the 1997 election, the 2000 
Climate Change Programme committed the UK 
to a 20% reduction of carbon emissions by 2010 
based on 1990 levels. The Programme explicitly 
mentions the SO as one of the six key UK policy 
measures to save carbon (DETR 2000). However, 
at the time the targets were comparably humble 
and nothing of the scale seen later in the 2000s. 
The concept of having more long term targets did 
not exist at that time and it took some time until 
climate change targets became more ambitious. 
A report published by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution in 2000 on energy and 
climate change initiated a discussion about long-
term targets by recommending for the first time a 
60% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 
based on 1990 levels. The same figure also 
featured as an indicative target in the 2003 
Energy White Paper that stressed that in order to 
achieve that sort of scale of reduction, the SO 
‘will have a major role to play in homes’ (DTI, 
2003, p. 34). 
The growing importance of climate change policy 
as a driver for the SO was also reflected in a 
modification of the metric: Under EESoP 1-3 the 
target was simply defined in kWh savings to be 
achieved (although it was an indicative target, the 
actual target was set in £ per customer per year). 
EEC 1 introduced a target with fuel weighted 
kWh, i.e. it depended on the carbon intensity of 
the fuel saved how much it would count towards 
the target. So effectively, EEC 1 introduced a 
carbon target. From EEC 1 onwards, climate 
change policy appears to be the strongest driver 
and the UK carbon targets put pressure on the 
government departments to deliver a substantial 
contribution to the targets via the SO. 
Going forward, the SO remained a key element in 
the government’s climate change strategy. The 
SO featured among the top three additional 
measures to save carbon across all sectors in the 
2006 Climate Change Programme (HM 
Government 2006). This was also confirmed in 
the 2007 Energy White Paper: The government 
expected that in 2020 the SO would deliver up to 
17% of all carbon reduction measures planned at 
the time, making it the second most significant 
measure after the EU emissions trading scheme. 
The White Paper highlights the government’s 
commitment to continue delivering carbon 
savings in the household sector via the SO until at 
least 2020 (DTI 2007). 
Finally, in order to align the SO with the wider 
climate policy landscape, the metric of the SO 
changed from TWh to carbon emissions when 
CERT commenced in 2008. The Climate Change 
and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 gave powers to 
the government to set the obligations in the form 
of a carbon emissions reduction target. 
 
4.3 Rising energy prices 
In the 1980s and 1990s, energy prices were low 
compared to the 2000s with the general trend of 
falling prices since the early 1980s. However, 
from 2002/2003 onwards energy prices of all 
fuels grew dramatically - gas prices in real terms 
almost doubled in just a decade, prices for coal 
and smokeless fuels increased by 65%, and 
electricity prices by 45% (DECC 2011d). 
The rising energy prices particularly affected the 
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SO in 2008, when prices increased more rapidly 
than any price rise since the 1973 oil crisis: 
Residential gas prices in 2008 mounted by almost 
50% in real terms in just four quarters, resulting 
from rising wholesale gas prices in continental 
Europe, where gas prices are contractually linked 
to oil prices. Similarly, electricity prices went up 
by almost 30%, also mainly due to rising 
wholesale gas prices. In the context of increasing 
energy bills, there were calls in early 2008 for a 
windfall tax on energy suppliers. A heated 
discussion had started after OFGEM reported to 
the Treasury and the Committee on Business and 
Enterprise that energy companies made £9 billion 
profit from EU ETS permits which were issued 
for free. In January 2008, OFGEM proposed a 
windfall tax on the major energy suppliers to help 
the fuel poor (OFGEM 2008a). Just a few weeks 
after the OFGEM proposal, ministers of the 
Treasury and the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform held a meeting 
with the heads of major energy suppliers and told 
them that they might face a levy on their profits 
to help the poor. As expected, the proposals were 
not met with great enthusiasm by the energy 
suppliers. 
The government, however, did not agree on the 
matter - Chancellor Alistair Darling and John 
Hutton, the Business Secretary, opposed a 
windfall tax on the basis that energy companies 
needed extra funds to expand low carbon energy 
sources. More than 70 Labour MPs signed a 
petition that called for a windfall tax and hoped to 
make the issue one of the dominating themes of 
the party’s annual conference in September. In 
early August 2008, ministers of various 
government departments examined different 
alternatives to a windfall tax. One of them was to 
oblige energy companies to spend the bulk of the 
money under CERT in the first two years, and 
also to increase the share spent on helping the 
fuel poor. Raising the proportion of auctioned EU 
ETS permits and a carbon levy was also 
considered. On 11 September 2008, Number 10 
finally revealed the package they negotiated with 
the energy companies – the Home Energy Saving 
Programme. The package included an increase in 
the existing CERT target by 20% with a new 
target of 185 million lifetime tonnes of CO2 for 
the period April 2008 - March 2011. This implied 
additional expenditure by the energy suppliers of 
an estimated £560 million (HM Government 
2008). Number 10 argued that the programme 
had advantages over a windfall tax and that ‘by 
choosing this route the Government can more 
swiftly help families cut fuel bills now and in the 
medium term; help secure the long-term 
investment in new low-carbon energy 
infrastructure this country requires; and help keep 
prices down’ (HM Government 2008, p. 2). 
Interestingly, raising the SO target by 20% 
initially led to an increase of energy prices as 
suppliers are allowed to simply pass through the 
costs of the SO to the energy customers. 
Therefore, the move had no significant financial 
impact (if at all) on energy suppliers’ profits 
(which was the focal point of the debate). 
Number 10 presented the decision as if energy 
suppliers had to spend an additional £1 billion on 
energy efficiency without mentioning that 
consumers were to pay for this in the end. It 
seems that energy companies’ pleas for not 
putting a windfall tax on them because they 
desperately needed to invest in new infrastructure 
had found an open ear. 
 
4.4 Institutional changes 
An important institutional change which affected 
the SO substantially in its further development 
happened in 2002 and will be described in the 
following. 
In 1994, the electricity regulator, OFFER, put 
energy efficiency standards of performance 
(EESoP) on the Public Electricity Suppliers 
(PESs), the fourteen companies created when the 
electricity market in the United Kingdom was 
privatised in 1990. Over a 4-year period EESoP 1 
raised about £100 million for energy efficiency 
projects, equivalent to £1 per customer per year 
(Owen 1997). However, OFFER did not raise the 
amount of money expected by ministers, and 
OFFER’s Director General was concerned that 
higher obligations ‘would raise issues more 
appropriately dealt with through general fiscal 
policy’ (ENDS 1994). Also the second EESoP 
scheme, which operated from 1998-2000, did not 
raise significantly more funds than EESoP 1. 
Using similar arguments, OFGAS rejected such a 
scheme for the gas sector entirely (see more 
details in section on change of key personnel). 
Without changes in primary legislation it looked 
like further measures would be extremely 
difficult to implement. The new Labour 
Government that came into power in 1997 
announced a review of utility regulations. In 
2000, the proposals took shape and were passed 
through parliament as part of the Utility Bill. The 
Bill gave the Secretary of State powers, by order, 
to impose energy savings targets on gas and 
electricity utilities. This resolved some of the 
conflicts over the first SO schemes, which 
struggled to get regulators’ support due to 
conflicting duties and unclear responsibilities. 
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The Utilities Bill directed the responsibility for 
target setting to central government (DETR, then 
DEFRA and DECC) and obliged the regulator to 
implement the schemes that would be needed to 
reach the targets. This enabled the government to 
significantly extend EESoP, imposing much more 
ambitious targets on energy companies. DETR 
set the first target in the Electricity and Gas 
(Energy Efficiency Obligations) Order 2001. The 
target of the old EESoP 3 scheme was only 11 
TWh (4.9 TWh Electricity & 6.1 TWh Gas), 
whereas its successor, EEC 1, put a much higher 
target of 62 TWh on energy suppliers (OFGEM 
2005). 
The institutional change that occurred in Britain 
resulted from a lengthy political debate about the 
role of the energy regulators and their 
unwillingness to increase expenditure for energy 
efficiency measures. In order to realise 
substantial carbon emission reductions in the 
domestic sector, modifying the institutional 
framework appeared to be the only option. Hence 
the institutional change constituted a deliberate 
means to achieve carbon reduction goals in the 
housing sector rather than an unrelated 
coincidence. 
 
4.5 Change of key personnel 
Change of key personnel can trigger policy 
change in some instances and is a recognised 
mechanism in the literature on policy change (e.g. 
Sabatier 1988). A good example of the impact of 
changing key personnel affecting the dynamics of 
policy change can be found in the UK during 
EESoP 1 and 2: In the 1990s, when the SO was 
still run entirely by the regulator (including the 
target setting procedure), change of personnel at 
the top of the regulator OFGAS had a significant 
effect on the development of the SO. The 
following part shows how a single person, Claire 
Spottiswoode, who became director of OFGAS in 
1993, successfully blocked any attempts of 
implementing a SO in the gas sector and 
downgraded the E factor significantly. In 
contrast, OFFER’s director was much more 
sympathetic to running energy efficiency 
programmes and put in place the first SO in 
electricity in 1994. Only when a new OFGAS 
director was appointed, the way was finally 
cleared for having a SO in gas as well. 
In 1991, Sir James McKinnon, the Director 
General of OFGAS, announced a new gas price 
control formula to operate from 1992. This 
formula would include an ‘E-factor’ allowing gas 
suppliers to pass 100% of the costs of energy 
efficiency projects approved by the Director 
General through to gas customers. McKinnon 
expected that around £50 million a year might be 
spent on energy efficiency measures (Owen 
2006). Money raised via the E factor was 
supposed to help fund the Energy Saving Trust 
(EST) that was established by the government, 
British Gas and public electricity supply 
companies in 1992 to reduce home energy use 
and the associated carbon emissions (Owen 
1997). Although OFGAS established the E factor, 
the regulator made it pretty clear from the 
beginning that it did not see wider environmental 
goals within its remit and this ought to be dealt 
with by central government (House of Commons 
Environment Committee 1993b). This would 
become an issue of great controversy later on. 
The story took a very different turn when 
McKinnon left office in 1993 and Claire 
Spottiswoode took over. As a result of her 
appointment, in November 1993, there were 
serious concerns that not enough money could be 
raised for EST making it impossible for the 
Agency to deliver the CO2 savings promised in 
the Climate Change Programme. Claire 
Spottiswoode rejected raising money via the E 
factor for energy efficiency measures 
administered by EST. While the 1986 Gas Act 
did provide some leverage for OFGAS to support 
energy efficiency measures, Spottiswoode did not 
feel comfortable raising prices (OFGAS, 1994). 
Spottiswoode took the view that one should not 
interfere with the purity of the market with cross-
subsidies of this kind. Once the market was fully 
liberalised, she argued, energy efficiency 
measures would just be offered by the energy 
companies as part of a competitive market 
offering and consumers were best placed to 
decide whether they wanted energy efficiency 
measures or not. Spottiswoode expected that to 
happen in 1998, when the whole of the gas 
market had been opened to competition. Only in 
the mean time, she argued, there would be some, 
but a very limited, role for energy efficiency 
measures as encouraged by the E factor (OFGAS, 
1994). As a result, British Gas submitted a greatly 
scaled down package of EST projects to OFGAS, 
but most of their proposals were subsequently 
rejected by the regulator. In the end less than £2 
million compared to the £50 million announced 
by McKinnon was spent by the time the E factor 
had ended in March 1997 (Owen, 2006). 
Following the same logic of argument, 
Spottiswoode also declined to put an obligation 
similar to EESoP on gas suppliers. There was the 
feeling that without reforming the primary 
legislation, i.e. the 1986 Gas Act, further energy 
efficiency programmes that involved gas 
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suppliers would be very unlikely. 
The appointment of a new OFGAS director 
would eventually break the deadlock. Finally, in 
September 1998, Claire Spottiswoode’s term as 
Director General of OFGAS came to an end and 
Callum McCarthy was appointed to be her 
successor. From the beginning on, McCarthy was 
much more sympathetic to having schemes such 
as the SO in gas and subsequently extended the 
SO to the gas sector. 
 
4.6 Fuel poverty 
In Britain fuel poverty is an important driver of 
energy policy and became a distinct issue of 
public concern following the oil crisis in 1973-
1974. The recognition of regressive impacts of 
rising energy prices led to a distinction of fuel 
poverty from general poverty (Bradshaw 1983). 
Boardman argued that fuel poverty is different 
from income poverty because of ‘the crucial role 
of housing stocks - the house, heating system and 
other energy using equipment’ (Boardman 1991, 
p. 221). 
Fuel poverty in the UK is defined as the need to 
spend more than 10% of household income on all 
energy use in order to maintain a satisfactory 
heating regime and other energy services (DECC 
2011a). The original definition of fuel poverty 
goes back to Boardman (1991). Note that the 
official definition of fuel poverty used is 
currently under review by John Hills (2011) and 
it may change in the future. 
However, the Conservative government did not 
recognise fuel poverty as a problem and avoided 
using the phrase in official documents (Boardman 
2010). Its focus was very much on privatisation 
of the energy industry assuming that the benefits 
of this process would eventually reach all 
customers in form of cheaper energy prices 
(Sharratt et al. 2007). 
While the Conservative government more or less 
ignored fuel poverty, it became an issue of high 
political significance immediately after Labour 
Party won the 1997 election (Boardman 2010). In 
the 1999 consultation paper on energy efficiency 
OFGEM explicitly mentions fuel poverty as one 
of the key objectives of energy efficiency 
schemes (OFGEM 1999). This was also reflected 
in OFGEM’s Social Action Plan (OFGEM 2000), 
a document that the new Labour Central 
government asked the regulators to prepare as a 
result of a fundamental review of utility 
regulation (DTI 1998). The objective of reducing 
fuel poverty was incorporated legally in the 2000 
Utilities Act which states that the regulator and 
the Secretary of State must have regard to the 
interests of individuals regarded as fuel poor. 
In addition to the Utilities Act, tackling fuel 
poverty became enshrined in legislation in 2000 
when the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation 
Act passed through parliament. The Act resulted 
in the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy and committed 
the UK to eradicate fuel poverty in vulnerable 
households in England by 2010 (DTI 2001) and 
eradicate fuel poverty in all households as far as 
is reasonably practicable by 2016. The SO is 
mentioned several times in the document as one 
of the measures that would help to bring down 
fuel poverty. 
Ironically, shortly after the adoption of the UK 
Fuel Poverty Strategy fuel poverty increased 
rapidly. The problem with the UK Fuel Poverty 
Strategy was that it relied on falling or at least not 
rising fuel prices (Boardman 2010). However, 
energy prices increased significantly over the last 
decade as pointed out in an earlier section. As a 
result, the number of households living in fuel 
poverty actually went up, not down following the 
adoption of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy (DECC 
2011a). Due to the rising number of households 
in fuel poverty there was constant pressure on the 
SO to address fuel poverty at least to some extent. 
This is also mirrored in the introduction of the 
obligatory Priority Group target of 50%, 
previously there was only an indicative target 
(DEFRA 2001). 
The process caused a lot of tension due to the 
different objectives of the SO (reducing carbon 
emissions on the one hand and fuel poverty on 
the other), a process that is not unusual when 
putting social and environmental obligations on 
private utilities in a liberalised market (Jones 
2001). 
Subsequently, the SO was seen as a programme 
that could do both, reducing carbon emissions 
and contributing to the eradication of fuel 
poverty. However, at the latest from EEC 2 
onwards it became clear that there was some 
confusion over the goals of the SO and also some 
evolving conflicts around those. While 
eradicating fuel poverty is mentioned in all the 
consultation documents following EESoP 3 as 
one of the objectives of the SO, the primary aim 
of the SO remained the reduction of carbon 
emissions. 
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This becomes very clear in the EEC 2 
consultation document: The document stresses 
that EEC 1 ‘was not intended to specifically 
target the fuel poor’ (DEFRA 2004a, p. 7) and 
that the’ primary aim is to make a significant 
contribution to the UK’s legally binding target 
under the Kyoto protocol’ (ibid., p. 5). This is 
restated more strongly in the CERT consultation 
where it is stressed that the SO ‘does not have a 
specific fuel poverty objective’, that the PG target 
was put in place ‘for reasons of equity’ (DEFRA 
2006a, p. 7) and that the SO will ‘only ever be 
able to make a limited contribution to meeting 
our fuel poverty targets’ (ibid., p. 29). The change 
in focus has been described as ‘a discursive shift 
away from fuel poverty, toward a more `pure' 
carbon reduction market’ (Powells 2009, p. 
2352). 
With energy prices unlikely to fall significantly 
over the next years and fuel poverty still being at 
very high levels with about 4 million households 
classified as fuel poor in England in 2009 (DECC 
2011a), the conflicts sketched above will 
probably not go away. 
 
4.7 Energy efficiency industry 
Another driving force that has been identified is 
the uptake of the energy efficiency industry as a 
result of the SO. While the cost of the scheme is 
born by energy suppliers and their customers in 
the first place, the beneficiaries of the policy 
instrument clearly are the companies providing 
the energy efficiency measures incentives by the 
SO. With expenditures of currently more than £1 
billion per year the SO creates a significant 
market for the energy efficiency industry. 
A good example is insulation measures, which 
are the most important measures in terms of their 
contribution to the overall targets. Obviously 
there had been some activity in the insulation 
market already prior to the SO, but installation 
rates were much lower compared to what was 
undertaken during the last SO schemes. Before 
EESoP 1 started in 1994, only around 100,000 
cavity wall insulation installations were carried 
out per year (Lees 2006). During EEC 2 and the 
first three years of CERT more than 550,000 
cavity wall insulation installations were carried 
out on average every year. Even if one assumes 
that the activity that had been there prior to the 
SO already is included to 100% in that figure, it 
still means that the market for cavity wall 
insulation effectively grew by a factor of more 
than five within just ten years as a result of the 
SO. Figures on the business as usual installation 
rates are also provided by the Impact Assessment 
of the Green Deal and the Energy Company 
Obligation which indicate that less than 50,000 
cavity walls would be insulated without policy 
support (DECC 2011c). Those figures imply that 
EEC 2 and CERT increased the installation rate 
by a factor of eleven. 
According to Toke (2000), the interest groups 
around energy efficiency did not have much 
influence in the 1980s and early 1990s, but at the 
end of the 1990s they were in a powerful position 
in the decision making process. Particularly over 
the last 10 years the energy efficiency industry 
has been getting stronger and continuously put 
pressure on government to increase the savings 
targets. 
The two main associations representing the 
interests of the energy efficiency industry 
benefiting from the SO are the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy (ACE) and the National 
Insulation Association (NIA). In the early days of 
its existence ACE had limited impact on 
government policy, although it quickly developed 
a visible public and press profile (Owen 1995). 
While not as visible as ACE, NIA is another 
important energy efficiency industry lobby 
organisation. ACE and NIA frequently provide 
evidence to policy makers and respond to 
relevant consultations expressing its support of 
the SO, asking for higher targets and highlighting 
the capability of the insulation industry to deliver 
more. Also, an umbrella body, the British Energy 
Efficiency Federation (BEEF), acts on behalf of 
19 trade associations involved with the energy 
efficiency market. The Federation meets quarterly 
with government officials to discuss relevant 
matters. According to Toke (2000), BEEF helped 
the energy efficiency industry to gain increased 
access to civil servants and ministers by, for 
example, being involved already at the pre-
consultation stage rather than after proposals are 
finalised. 
While it is not possible to identify the particular 
features that were modified in the SO as a result 
of pressure by organisations such as ACE, NIA, 
and BEEF, there is evidence that those groups 
managed to get involved more directly in the 
decision making processes, for example by being 
consulted prior to the official consultation stage 
and being part of important stakeholder forums. 
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4.8 Perceived successfulness of policy 
instrument 
Another driving factor of the SO is the perceived 
successfulness of the SO. While initially there 
were concerns about how such a policy 
instrument might work and what the costs and 
benefits would be, government became much 
more confident in the SO and considered it as 
very successful. This also comes out of the 
government reports in which the SO was labelled 
for example as ‘highly successful’ (DEFRA 
2007b, p. 28), the ‘flagship energy efficiency 
scheme’ (DECC 2009, p. 5), and ‘one of the most 
cost-effective policies to reduce carbon 
emissions’ (DEFRA 2007a, p. 4). Those claims 
were based on various evaluations of the SO 
which all attributed substantial savings to the 
policy (2006, 2008; OFGEM and Energy Saving 
Trust 2003). 
However, it took a while until the SO was so 
highly regarded. At first, people did not want to 
over-commit to something they were not familiar 
with and there were concerns about the costs and 
the benefits and whether it would work. 
However, those concerns diminished after a 
while. Part of addressing those concerns was the 
publication of an assessment by the National 
Audit Office in 1998 which concluded that 
EESoP 1 was a successful and cost-effective 
scheme that should be extended and widened in 
the future (National Audit Office 1998). Also 
according to the results of the Climate Change 
Programme Review, the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment was one of the most cost-effective 
policies to reduce carbon emissions (DEFRA 
2006b). In its CERT consultation DEFRA 
announced that it had therefore be ‘decided to 
maximise carbon emission reductions via this 
policy mechanism’ (DEFRA 2007a, p. 4). 
The energy suppliers played an important role in 
the process of growing confidence in the 
effectiveness of the SO. Throughout the various 
schemes suppliers frequently raised concerns 
about the targets being too ambitious and at some 
stages even, for example prior to EEC 1, that 
those could never be met. 
However, in the end suppliers delivered and 
discharged their obligations long before the end 
of all schemes. Because suppliers met their 
targets so comfortably, government became more 
confident that the targets could be increased. 
This is also highlighted in the CERT consultation 
document (DEFRA 2006a). While energy 
suppliers kept raising concerns about the size of 
the targets they seemed to have lost credibility 
given that in spite of pointing out how difficult 
those targets were they always delivered what 
was expected. Therefore the government felt 
confident to enlarge the targets every time a new 
SO scheme was designed. 
However, in the beginning suppliers had much 
more flexibility with regard to the types of 
measures they could promote through the SO. 
Suppliers chose to deliver their obligations 
mainly via low cost insulation measures such as 
cavity wall and loft insulation and energy 
efficient light bulbs. When CERT was revised in 
2010 a quota was implemented requiring 
suppliers to deliver at least 68% of the savings 
via insulation measures. Also, energy efficient 
light bulbs were banned from the scheme in light 
of the EU wide policy to phase out incandescent 
light bulbs. These developments are likely to 
make it much more difficult for energy suppliers 
to achieve their targets and there are first signs 
that suppliers may not deliver their obligation as 
comfortably as happened in the past. The UK 
government warned suppliers in September 2011 
that they need to increase their activity in order 
not to miss the 68% insulation target (DECC 
2011b). 
 
4.9 Drivers found not relevant 
Surprisingly, EU policy did not appear to have a 
significant if any impact on the SO, although 
there were considerations around linking the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme with White 
Certificate Schemes similar to the SO. However, 
the additional benefits from such a linkage 
appeared to be limited (NERA 2006; Sorrell et al. 
2009) which is why the DEFRA decided against 
pursuing such ideas. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper sketched the development of the 
principal home energy efficiency policy 
instruments in the UK from its inception 
identifying some, but not all, driving forces that 
impacted on policy change. The SO shows 
remarkable and frequent changes in its 
development, and arguably few people would 
have expected the scheme ever reaching the scale 
it reached in recent years. The analysis of the 
drivers shows that it was mainly gradual 
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processes that caused the changes which 
happened over time. This is contrary to the 
perception that significant policy change can only 
be triggered by crisis events. 
While the SO was initially driven by attempts to 
incentivise the efficient consumption of energy at 
a time of market liberalisation, other issues such 
as climate change, rising energy prices, and fuel 
poverty became more and more important over 
time. In addition, changes in institutional 
structures and key personnel had a significant 
impact on the SO. The growth of the energy 
efficiency industry and the perceived 
successfulness of the SO put further pressure on 
the government to stick with the instrument and 
increase the targets. 
The question remains whether the trend of ever 
increasing targets will continue in the future 
given that rising targets also mean a higher 
contribution by households on their bills 
particularly because the potential for low cost 
measures will at some point be depleted. 
According to a recent government consultation, 
the successor of the current SO will set a target 
equivalent to expenditure levels slightly higher 
than those generated at the moment. However, 
the carbon target is supposed to be much lower 
due to a redirection of the SO from low cost 
measures to more high cost measures and the 
introduction of new policy instruments to 
incentive the low cost measures. Whether this 
will happen is still out in the open, but it could 
have a significant effect on the SO once again. 
Therefore, future developments promise to be an 
interesting area for more research. 
Additionally, an analysis based firmly in theories 
of the policy process and policy change could 
further advance our understanding of the 
underlying processes. A good starting point for 
such an analysis would be theories looking at 
change processes taking into account cumulative 
pressures. 
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